MOLAB/MOLEM/MOCOM/MOCAN: The Eagle Gets Around (Apollo Applications Program, Part II)


The MOLAB, heading away from the astronauts’ LEM on a 14-day mission. As well as this purpose-built version of the rover shown here, NASA considered three other versions that re-used other equipment being built for Apollo. Image from Lunar Mobility Systems Comparison and Evolution Study (MOBEV): Final Presentation Report. Click for a larger view.

What it was: Four proposals to deal with the same issue: once the lunar lander touched down, it was stuck there and its crew had to suit up and walk to anywhere they wanted to study. As the Apollo lunar base was getting up and running, one of these four ideas would be used to give astronauts a mobile laboratory with a “shirtsleeve” environment in which they could trundle around the surface of the Moon on jaunts to various interesting locations.

Details: We’ve previously discussed one suggestion for using Apollo hardware beyond its base purpose of getting people to the Moon and bringing them back. The Manned Venus Flyby was by far the most extreme option considered, but there were many other possibilities: NASA and its contractors put a lot of work into figuring out what else the various bits of Apollo hardware (with modification) could do.

The MOLAB was, as its name suggests, a mobile laboratory. The first Apollo missions relied entirely on legwork for getting around, and while Apollos 15 through 17 had the benefit of the lunar rover (LRV), it was far from perfect. If nothing else, mission duration was restricted by the fact that it had no life support—its passengers relied on their spacesuits for air and the like, and so missions could be no more than a few hours long.

Before budget pressures forced NASA to cut back to one Saturn V per mission, the plan was to support extended Apollo missions by sending a second lander (the LM Truck) carrying support equipment. Accordingly NASA was generous with weight—potentially up to 3860 kilograms was allowed—and came up with a plan for an entirely new piece of equipment, the MOLAB proper. After delivery to the Moon it would then be offloaded from the truck, set up, and then boarded by the astronauts and used while their LEM was put into hibernation. But aware of the eye of Congress on them even before the budget cuts started to hit, though, they also asked Bendix Corporation (builders of scientific packages for Apollo, and a company that had been studying lunar rovers and fliers for NASA since 1961) to look at three other possibilities for enclosed vehicles that the Truck could bring.


The LEM, repurposed as the crew cabin for a MOLAB. Image from Lunar Surface Mobility System Comparison and Evolution (MOBEV): Final Report. Click for a larger view.

The first was the MOLEM. The basic idea here was that the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) was primarily designed to give astronauts someplace to live while on the surface of the Moon, so why not just keep going with that idea? Though some redesign would be necessary even beyond the deletion of its ascent rocket and the addition of wheels, it would be cheaper than starting from scratch with a full MOLAB.

Carrying a crew of two, the MOLEM would have been able to drive for 400 kilometers and go up a 35° incline. This meant it would be going around craters and other rough terrain rather than over it, so Bendix felt this translated to an 80 kilometer radius for missions. With a roaring top speed of 16.7 kilometers per hour these travels could be spread out across two weeks, with another week in emergency supplies if they were needed. The air inside was to have been 100% oxygen at 0.34 atmospheres, a choice that at first places the Bendix report prior to the Apollo 1 fire (and it is, having been completed in November 1966) until one realizes that the real-world lunar modules used pure oxygen as well. It’s hard not to think that, given the extra payload capability supplied by the LM Truck, this would nevertheless have changed if any of the MOLABs had gone ahead.

Altogether the MOLEM would have rung in at 3516 kilograms, which was a point in its favour. Not only could the LM Truck carry it, there was even leftover room for other equipment.


An Apollo CM as the MOLAB. Image from same source as previous. Click for a larger view.

The next option was the MOCOM. This was a less-obvious possibility, being an Apollo Command Module (CM) with wheels attached. Unlike the LEM this piece of equipment was never designed to go anywhere other than orbit, but the thinking was it was also designed to support its own weight while on Earth, so in all it should be able to handle the lunar environment. The lack of air on the surface was the same as conditions in orbit, and the Moon’s 0.16 gravities would be a snap compared to Earth’s hefty pull.

This CM’s heat shield would be scrapped as useless, as would the various bits of instrumentation and attitude control rockets needed for flight. As the regular CM hatch proved to be badly placed for a lunar vehicle, an airlock would be added along with the wheels, drive train, and transmission. As it would use essentially the same powertrain as the MOLEM, it would have the same duration and trip length, while also carrying the same amount of cargo (320 kilograms). The major difference between the two would be in the amount of space the astronauts would have to move around in during their excursion: the MOLEM was smaller at 4.2 cubic meters in volume (compared to the MOCOM’s 6.2 cubic meters), and had less floor space (2.4 square meters as opposed to 4.1)—which meant that the MOLEM wouldn’t let the astronauts sit down while driving. Finally, while the MOCOM was slightly heavier at 3743 kilograms, it too would fit on the LM Truck.


A Boeing CAN — intended for a variety of uses on the lunar surface, but primarily a cargo container for the LM Truck — converted for use as a MOLAB. Image from same source as previous. Click for a larger view.

The final possibility was to use a CAN, a proposed piece of hardware—the Multipurpose Mission Module—from Boeing. Unlike the LEM and CM this wasn’t already developed when the Bendix report dropped, but it was considered a strong contender for a variety of uses in the future Apollo lunar base. As the base was still a going concern at the end of 1966, NASA clearly felt that it would be worth seeing what good a CAN could serve as a MOLAB if they were already going to be building them anyway. The CAN was specifically designed to be as large as something could be while still fitting on top of the LM Truck, which meant that it was considerably more roomy—38.2 cubic meters and 7.9 square meters of floor—than the LEM and the CM: a major plus if you’re planning on sticking two people in it for two weeks, and a size that even allowed a crew of up to four. Unfortunately, as it was already as big as what the LM Truck was supposed to handle, and didn’t really have anything that could be stripped out, it rang in at 4326 kilograms if given the same capabilities as the other two vehicles. To get it down to fighting weight it had to be reduced to 200 kilometers of travel and eight days of life support (not counting the emergency extension supplies).

All this can be compared to the real MOLAB. It, again, had the same basic trip characteristics as the MOLEM and MOCOM, but being specifically designed for its purpose was able to do so with the lowest weight of all, 3221 kilograms, and so had the associated advantage of letting the LM Truck carrying other things besides just it. It also had more interior space than anything except a CAN, at 7.7 cubic meters.

The final decision of the Bendix report was that the need to make the driver stand while using the MOLEM took it out of the running, while the MOCAN’s restricted duration and range did the same for it. The MOCOM was “just right” but at the cost of being slightly less comfortable for the astronauts while also using up over 500 kilograms more of the LM Truck’s payload capacity. At that point they then threw the problem back at NASA, essentially telling them to pick based on what was more important to them: saving money by re-using a CM, or maybe not having a useful piece of equipment on the Moon because of those 500 wasted kilograms.

What happened to make it fail: Like much of Apollo, even the last few planned missions up to Apollo 20, budget cuts prevented any version of the MOLAB from reaching the Moon.


The seating issue that took the LEM variant of the MOLAB out of the running. Image source same as previous. Click for a larger view.

The Apollo Lunar Base was cancelled outright in 1968, but MOLAB’s death came about more particularly because of the cancellation of the Saturn V past the original production run of 15 rockets. MOLAB depended entirely on the LM Truck, and the LM Truck depended on there being two Saturn V’s available for each mission—one to launch the astronauts as per the usual Apollo mission, and one to launch the Truck with the cargo the astronauts would be using. Once that became impossible, any rover weighing 3800 kilograms was a no go. The actual lunar rovers that were sent to the Moon could be loaded up with the astronauts’ LEM, as they massed a mere 210 kilograms.

What was necessary for it to succeed: The best bet might have been for someone other than Thomas Paine to follow James Webb as NASA administrator in 1969 (or for the Democrat Webb to carry on somehow even as the White House changed from Johnson to Nixon). Paine was very much committed to a technically feasible but politically impossible agenda for NASA based on advancing the state of space technology and moving on to Mars. Someone more realistic might have committed to the Apollo Application Program’s goal of sticking with Apollo-era hardware and improving it incrementally as technology got better over time—an approach quite similar to what the USSR and Russia have done with Soyuz and the R-7 rocket family down to the present day, though to be fair they’ve never had to maintain a lunar launch capability. It may have taken a lot longer than they thought it would in 1966, but something similar to the MOLAB might have hit the lunar dust eventually.

The sticking point here was the Saturn V. It was already shut down in August 1968, with NASA just living on the ones already built until 1973, and the ability to get the production lines running again disappeared over the next few years. Knowledge of the Saturn V’s powerful F-1 engine lasted longer and might have been used for something similar to a Saturn V (without necessarily being a Saturn V) for a few more years after that, but ultimately the clock was ticking just as NASA’s budget was reaching its nadir in the mid-1970s.

10 thoughts on “MOLAB/MOLEM/MOCOM/MOCAN: The Eagle Gets Around (Apollo Applications Program, Part II)

  1. Realistically, was even Apollo Applications follow-on financially and politically possible? Apollo was so geared to get astronauts there and back alive by 1970 that everything from the Saturn itself on down was driven by schedule feasibility rather than extensibility, scalability, etc. Incremental improvement is surely the way to go in principle, but “hooks” for that really need to be built in from the start. The unpalatable truth is that Apollo was conceived and executed as a stunt, not a foundation for ongoing development.

    • While it’s entirely possible that you’re right — the only way to be sure about the possibility of anything is to have it actually happen — I have to disagree. On balance I think it would have worked, with the countervailing example being the one mentioned in the article: the Soviets.

      Their primary space program was a stunt, arguably more so than the American program and Korolev worked to accomplish useful things around the demands of Khrushchev for propaganda value. Yet the Soyuz has been radically upgraded in capability over time.

      Another example from behind the Iron Curtain would be Chelomei’s Almaz. It was a relatively basic military station that turned into modular civilian stations like Salyut-6 and -7 and finally the very accomplished Mir.

      In both cases, Russia’s failure to build even further on these is, I think, much more reflective of their financial problems than anything intrinsic to the original nature of the hardware.

      For Apollo, it comes down to not thinking that it’s a binary between meeting the schedule and baking in some good foundation work. Just like the Russians there was nothing stopping NASA’s people from starting with the political grandstanding of their leaders and giving them what they wanted while also building what was actually useful to the extent that they could. Wernher von Braun was notorious for this going back as far as Peenemunde — and why would a good fraction of the smart people working for NASA fail to do so too?

      I look at the Apollo hardware and it’s my opinion that they did, well enough that they could have continued with it a fair distance beyond what they did. Could it have been better? Absolutely. Did it have usefulness at least into the 80s? I think so.

      • (I should point out that when I say “it would have worked”, all I mean is “I think NASA had a decent if not certain chance of being able to do useful stuff with the Apollo hardware for another 15 years or so, including one or more long-term-but-not-permanent — under a year’s habitation, I’d say — Moon exploration bases”. To which a reasonable response is “So what?”, since it’s not like a manned Moon base is particularly useful for anything.)

      • We’re not far apart — but ask yourself: if it were c. 1960 and you were planning a sustained human presence on the moon, would you have sized a launcher for 110mt to LEO and 45mt to TLI? It would have taken a *lot* more Saturns before significant economies of scale kicked in.

        Certainly von Braun was thinking “next step” all along. But he had experienced an extraordinary series of big ramp-ups in support: from the VfR to Kummersdorf… from Kummersdorf to Peenemunde… from the desultory US missile program of 1946-1952 to the ICBM race… and from Sputnik through Apollo. His 1950s space station and Marsprojekt presupposed more such increases, and that IMHO was never in the cards.

        I enjoy the blog and look forward to the book. FWIW, my view is that at least with foreseeable technologies, space is going to take a lot longer and cost a lot more than most space fans are willing to face… and that thrilling as Apollo was while it lasted, the “swing for the fences” approach has done more harm than good.

        • What size would you argue is best for a sustained human presence? (I’m asking, not arguing) It seems a vexed question, since something smaller than a Saturn V is not useful and something bigger would be starved for payloads that could only be launched on it–thus meaning you’d only need one every now and then and how is a company supposed to sustain a business with one sale every few years?

          Turning to the other issue, I think that we’re a long way yet from economic returns from space past the unmanned comms/weather/GPS satellites we already have. If a man from the future were to come back to tomorrow and tell me that we had a significant space economy in fifty years, I’d be surprised. I would accept 100 years, and raise my eyebrows only a little and ask for more details if he said 200. I like to think in terms of a loose analogy with North America, where people knew about it by 1500 but were still struggling to get any money out of it at all in 1600 — and that’s when there was air, water, and food for the taking as soon as they stepped off the boat.

          Where I think we may disagree is that I do have sympathy for Mallory’s “Because it’s there argument”, while accepting that that’s a pretty rarefied reason for manned space exploration. There’s no good economic or scientific reason for Apollo to have existed, not at the size and expense of it, yet I don’t see it as a net debit. At worst neutral and, IMO, a positive for what it brought to the table. People just misinterpret or undervalue what it brought.

          In short, not a stunt but an exploit–to use basically the same description without the negative connotations.

          • Something smaller than a Saturn V “is not useful” only if every launch is a self-contained mission with CM/SM/LEM stack. If you permit orbital rendezvous, more than a LEM descent stage remaining on the lunar surface, and cargo-only missions, the picture changes.

            I wrote not that Apollo was a net debit but that the Apollo *approach* had done more harm than good, in that it set expectations we’re still dealing with: the flags & footprints fetish, the disdain for building on-orbit experience and capability as “going around in circles,” and so on. I was 19 for Apollo 11, and a science writer fairly well plugged in at NASA in the 1970s and early 1980s. I saw how those expectations shaped the Shuttle. On the face of it, it was absurd to expect that the *first* reusable system would be a robust, economical, fast-turnaround, all-mission space truck — like aiming for the DC-3 by 1910. But because Apollo had demonstrated we could point to center field like Babe Ruth and hit a home run there, some very good engineers talked themselves into believing we could master *cost-effective* LEO access equally quickly. In fact, it was (and remains) a much greater challenge than Apollo.

            We agree on the likely time scale. I’ve often urged people to take the phrase “Space Age” seriously, more in line with “Age of Exploration” or “Iron Age” than with the “Generation of Linux” or the “Decade, with Luck, of Facebook”…

        • The infrastructure at Cape Canaveral WAS designed for a *lot* more Saturns. ISTR reading an explanation that the VAB and mobile tower infrastructure doesn’t make sense except at a much higher launch rate than was ever acheived. Of course they laid that all out when EOR was the plan.

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